Intrigued by the trailers of the movie The Arrival, which I have not seen yet, I read the short story compilation Stories of your life and others by Ted Chiang.
The short story Story of your life, on which the movie is based, has a fascinating premise. However, I do hear that the film does not spend that much time on her discovery of and assimilation by the alien writing system “Heptapod B”, which to me was one of the more interesting threads.
Close to the end, an initially strong campaign for calliagnosia (a non-invasive and highly selective procedure to remove humans’ innate appreciation of attractiveness in others, already a great science-fiction philosophy prop) at the fictitious but influential unversity Pembleton is lost at the last minute due to a highly persuasive televised speech by the leader of the opposition.
Read the following extract for how exactly this was done:
In the latest on the Pembleton calliagnosia initiative, EduNews has learned that a new form of digital manipulation was used on the broadcast of PEN spokesperson Rebbecca Boyer’s speech. EduNews has received files from the SemioTech Warriors that contain what appear to be two recorded versions of the speech: an original — acquired from the Wyatt/Hayes (ed: PR firm) computers — and the broadcast version. The files also include the SemioTech Warriors’ analysis of the difference between the two versions.
The discrepancies are primarily enhancements to Ms. Boyer’s voice intonation, facial expressions and body language. Viewers who watch the original version rate Ms. Boyer’s performance as good, while those who watch the edited version rate her performance as excellent, describing her as extraordinarily dynamic and persuasive. The SemioTech Warriors conclude that Wyatt/Hayes has developed new software capabable of fine-tuning paralinguistic cues in order to maximize the emotional response evoked in viewers. This dramatically increases the effectiveness of recorded presentations … and its use in the PEN broadcast is likely what caused many supporters of the calliagnosia initiative to change their votes.
I would like to remind you that Ted Chiang wrote that story in 2002.
Up to now, the major mechanisms of influence have been curating which packets of information people consume. However, the tools for also modifying the contents of these packets of information seem to be ready.
We’ve been photoshopping photos of people to make those people appear more attractive since forever.
How long before we start seriously “videoshopping” televised speeches to make them more persuasive? With people consuming ever-increasing amounts of potentially personalised video, there’s an even bigger opportunity for those who desire to influence us for reasons less pure than just edification.
(Summary: Cryptographically signing messages with my long-term PGP keys is too important to give up. Doing this on my Android telephone is easier than I thought. You should strengthen your secret key encryption if you’re also going to do this.)
I agree with many of his points, especially the complexity of managing those keys, lack of forward secrecy (if someone were to steal my keys, they could decrypt all past conversations, unlike for example Signal) and accessibility (how do you verify a message with a baby on your left arm and your telephone in your right?). More generally, it makes a great deal of sense to make your security a moving target, as one of the Ars Technica commenters astutely summarised Filippo’s ideas.
Cryptographic signatures FTW
However, in spite of these factors, I am not yet ready to give up my PGP long-term keys.
Why is that?
Well, one of the most important uses of my long-term PGP keys is to cryptographically sign messages that can be verified by people in my network as having come from my hands.
For example, when I change my phone or re-flash its firmware (this has happened 3 or 4 times over the past two months because Android), I send PGP-signed messages to my main Signal correspondents with our new safety numbers.
With all of these correspondents I have in the past either done some sort of in-person formal PGP signing procedure, or I make use of the web of trust, or I rely on keybase. My business cards even have my key fingerprint on them (yes, I’m one of those nerds).
At their ends, the recipients of my messages are able to determine with an extremely high degree of confidence that I wrote the exact message they opened.
Accessible PGP on your smartphone with OpenKeychain
In terms of accessibility, the post did make me curious enough to experiment with a mobile PGP solution, as I also did have to agree that I’ve in the past often had to wait until I was behind one of my own laptops or workstations to PGP-verify a message.
As my one friend explained on Signal:
It’s tricky to verify a message with a baby in your left hand and a telephone in your right!
Seeing that I was planning on carrying my long-term private keys around on my telephone (BlackBerry PRIV, FDE encryption active FWIW), I had to double-check the security of the secret key encryption.
It turns out that PGP encrypts each of your secret keys with a hash of the passphrase you supply. My passphrase is significantly longer than the average, and consists of random characters (uppercase, lowercase, numbers, symbols). Passphrase length and complexity is by far the most important factor determining the safety of your encrypted secret key.
However, I had the default SHA-1 hash (ouch) with only 64k iterations. Iterating the hash is called key stretching: the passphrase is hashed, that result is hashed, and so on, for very many times, so that the testing of each passphrase takes more time, complicating brute-force cracking approaches.
Inspired by the writings of Chris Wellons who keeps his encrypted secret keys on a public website (!!!), I reconfigured my private key encryption to use 1 million iterations of the SHA-512 hash, and to use AES-256 for the encryption itself:
After typing that command, enter passwd at the prompt, then follow the prompts. You will have to enter your passphrase, and then enter your new passphrase twice.
You can then check that this operation is successful by using the command gpg --list-packets secring.gpg. My output looks as follows. Most important is that algo is 9 (AES-256), hash is 10 (SHA-512) and protect count in my case is just over 1 million.
SHA-512 is the slowest hash which PGP offers (see these oclHashcat benchmarks for example), which means that each iteration of a brute-force password cracking attempt will take a bit longer / eat more GPU watts, which is exactly what we want. You can increase the protect count for as long as the delay on your smartphone is still tolerable.
However, remember that a stronger and longer passphrase is much better! (so we do both)
Other than that, remember that Android security is far from good, so do as much as you can to keep your phone safe (keep up with OS updates, stay away from unofficial app markets, and so on).
Use your keys with OpenKeychain
I was pleasantly surprised to learn that I could directly import both my secring.pgp and pubring.gpg files from my ~/.gnupg directory. Right after selecting secring.pgp for import, the UI looked like this:
You can see the old 1024 bit key I made in 2000 to use for my Debian activities, and the 4096 bit key I currently use.
After importing your secret and public keyring, you are able to encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify any files or clipboard contents on your Android phone:
So if I receive something like this via Signal:
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Never gonna give you up, never gonna let you down
Never gonna run around and desert you
Never gonna make you cry, never gonna say goodbye
Never gonna tell a lie and hurt you
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
I long-press, copy the message and then select “read from clipboard” from OpenKeychain’s Encrypt/Decrypt screen, which, if everything checks out, shows me the following message:
Cryptographically signing a message is equally easy, except that you’ll have to enter that long passphrase of yours. OpenKeychain will then make the signed and optionally encrypted text text available for sharing to any app, or for copying and pasting:
Easy peasy, and tested under all sorts of usually-PGP-unfriendly conditions!
Maintaining PGP long-term keys certainly has its issues, but the possibility of cryptographically signing any message so that recipients can establish with high confidence that it originated from you is too important to give up.
With an app like OpenKeychain and sufficiently strong passphrase hashing and secret key encryption, you are able to use your keys with ease from your telephone.
Granted, you are trading in some security for this convenience. However, given the choice between discarding my PGP keys completely, vs. taking these steps, I’ll hold on to my keys for a little while longer.
In order to mitigate the potential damage of one of my long-term keys being compromised, I have resolved to generate and start using a new private key as soon as I run through my current batch of business cards, and to continue rotating like this in the future.
Let me know in the comments what you think. Do you know of a better alternative for remotely verifying the identity and messages of your correspondents?
(Post updated on August 25, 2016. See section at the end.)
The whole world is using WhatsApp to message each other. I often do too, because I want to inter-operate with the rest of the world.
However, WhatsApp belongs to Facebook.
Although Facebook has promised otherwise, the temptation to link all of your WhatsApp messages with Facebook logins (a straight-forward process, as they have the mobile phone numbers of a great number of their users) must be quite tempting to the people at Facebook. Imagine how well they would then be able to target their advertising, based on their access to both your Facebook profile and your private WhatsApp messages!
Fortunately, we now have an open source app, called Signal (available on Android, IOS and the desktop), which performs end-to-end encryption on all messages and voice calls that go through it. This means that absolutely no-one is able to read your messages or eavesdrop on your voice calls, except the intended recipients.
My request is that you get your contacts to install and start using Signal instead of WhatsApp wherever possible. At the very least some of our messages will not be accessible to various large corporations and any other prying eyes. If the security argument is not enough for you, there is one more extremely important topic: Signal handles animated gifs better than WhatsApp, at least on Android. (Telegram supports them on both Android on IOS, but it is by default less secure than Signal). See here the results of my experiments:
After Edward Snowden, former CIA and NSA employee, started revealing how massively, intensely and easily we are all being spied upon by the intelligence agencies of various governments, the terms above have suddenly been spending a great deal more time in the media.
It turns out that government agencies are allowed to extract, at a whim, your and my data from service providers, such as Google, Microsoft and Yahoo. There is no real legal process (unless you can call a secret judge in a secret court giving a secret order a real legal process), especially if you’re not a US citizen, and the providers that have been forced to give up your data in this way are not allowed to notify you about your digital self being violated. So even if they say that you shouldn’t worry, you can never be entirely sure.
Furthermore, it has also been revealed that the NSA has for years being acquiring encryption keys via legal (secretly forcing companies to give them the keys) and extra-legal (simply hacking into company servers) means. Even worse, they have for years been deliberately introducing security weaknesses into software products and encryption software in order to be able to crack open your data even more easily.
You can read more about this state of affairs in The Guardian’s NSA files. The Guardian has been doing a sterling job of analysing and bringing to light the depths to which our governments have sunk. There’s a whole lot of information, and most of it is quite upsetting.
For me the final straw was when secure email service lavabit voluntarily shut itself down, when faced with the prospect of being forced to leak user information to the US government without being allowed to tell anyone. The message on the site is quite chilling, and concludes with the following:
This experience has taught me one very important lesson: without congressional action or a strong judicial precedent, I would _strongly_ recommend against anyone trusting their private data to a company with physical ties to the United States.
At this point, I was a super happy and pretty heavy user of a number of US-based services, including GMail (all my email, about 40000 conversations consisting of 60000 mails, that’s excluding my work email which I also hosted on GMail), Google+ Photos (all my photos, about 21000 of ’em), Google Drive, Dropbox (50G of data spread out over 120000 files). In all cases, I still consider these to be best of class services. In putting my money where my mouth is, I was paying both Google and Dropbox for extra storage.
I also had no problem with Google filtering through my email to show me targeted advertising. This is the deal I had with them. I also had no problem with the possibility of someone getting my data after due legal process. However, the idea that some NSA or other government agency flunky could quite easily stick their grubby paws into my data, and that I would never know about this, was too much.
There’s probably nothing much of interest in my data. However, it has become a matter of principle; Privacy is a basic human right. Here’s an old essay by Bruce Schneier if you need to read more about why privacy is so important.
In short: It was time to extricate all of my lovely data from probably well-meaning US companies, thanks to the ridiculously powerful and secretive NSA, and thanks to all of its shadowy counterparts around the world.
Here’s how I did it:
Considered building another low-cost Linux server, or even a Raspberry Pi. Decided against this due to time required for configuration and acquired a Synology DS213j NAS, which is at this moment standing on the desk about 1 metre to my left. My recommendation: Just get this, you won’t be sorry.
Downloaded 60000 emails to Synology using Thunderbird mail client. Deleted everything from GMail. Google engineers assure me that after a few months, data will really be gone.
My webhoster (WebFaction) receives mail for all my domains. My Synology retrieves mail every 5 minutes via POP (you can set this up via Roundcube on the Synology) and deletes it from WebFaction.
Outgoing mail is relayed by the Synology via the WebFaction SMTP server. I don’t have to worry too much about blacklisting and whatnot, my hoster does this.
I’m back to interacting with my mail using Thunderbird and IMAP SSL. The loss of GMail conversation view was initially really REALLY painful. People have forgotten the ancient art of quoting. However, I’ve configured Thunderbird to archive all mail to year-stamped archive folders, and to put my sent mail there. Poor-man’s Conversation View! (the conversations plugin is wonky. it’s shocking how much the availability of GMail, which works really well, has stunted the development of alternative email clients) Importantly, I am now able to use OpenPGP again for the strong encryption and cryptographic signing of my emails.
All the data I had in Dropbox is now being synced between the Synology, two laptops and a workstation using BitTorrent Sync. This peer-to-peer syncing system is still a little rough around the edges, but falls squarely in the category of “Best Things Since Sliced Bread”, and it’s FAST. CloudStation, Synology’s dropbox-inspired solution, was just far too slow on my Synology model.
My photos (21000 of them) have been downloaded from Google+ Photos (thank you Google Takeout) and are now being served from the Synology using PhotoStation.
My music (5400+ tracks) is downloading from Google Music as we speak, and will be served from the Synology using AudioStation.
I make incremental backups of everything to an encrypted external USB drive, using dirvish. I will probably add an extra external drive to the mix and try to keep that off site.
It’s been an interesting process moving my stuff out, and getting used to these alternative systems is sometimes slightly uncomfortable, but I am quite happy with the end result. I hope that more people will take this step, and I really hope that more and easier-to-use alternatives for secure email (such as mailpile) and for ubiquitous private data will become available.
My submission of this post spent some time on the Hacker News front page, and from there was picked up by reddit as well. This brought many comments, a number of which were positive and thoughtful, and a number of which that were far less so. It’s amazing how anonymity and comment sections can bring out the worst in people. (if you have to know, the Hacker News community is generally MILES more polite than reddit)
In any case, I wanted to clarify an issue or two: After moving my data away from GMail and Dropbox, I am not under any impression that my data is now secure. I can still be hacked. My hardware and software could be full of backdoors. My email will still be read as it jumps from server to server, probably ending up in someone else’s GMail. :) However, if more people were to move their data out to their own premises, it becomes more complicated and costly for government agencies to monitor us all. At the moment, the NSA cuts deals with a few large email and other cloud service providers, and with that they’re able to monitor large swathes of users. However, if more of those users were to move away, many more deals have to be cut and servers hacked, costing more time and more money. Add to that increased used of OpenPGP (which I do use, and mention in my post), and it becomes even more difficult. I know that I’m just a drop in a bucket, but hey, at least I am a drop in a bucket!
My goal with posting this was to show that it’s relatively easy to move much of your data away. I have the feeling that many of the most impolite anonymous commenters still store their data with cloud providers, and would really prefer to believe that there are no worthwhile alternatives, hence all the ad hominem attacks.
Fortunately, each polite and humane comment makes up for a whole pile of bad ones. :)